

# Asymmetric Flooding as a Tool for Foreign Influence on Social Media

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## Abstract

Research on Russian troll activity during the 2016 US presidential campaign largely focused on divisive partisan messaging. Here, we document the use of apolitical content – content that could counteract mobilization efforts and escape detection in future campaigns. We argue this resembled techniques used by autocratic regimes domestically, in ‘flooding’ social media with entertainment content to distract from and displace mobilizing messaging. Using automated text analysis and hand-coding to construct a timeline of IRA messaging on Twitter, we find left-leaning trolls posted large volumes of entertainment content in their artificial liberal community and shifted away from political content late in the campaign. Simultaneously, conservative trolls were targeting their community with increases in political content. This suggests the use of apolitical content might be an overlooked strategy to selectively manipulate levels of attention to politics.

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Social media has given authoritarian governments new opportunities to influence public opinion – both domestically and abroad. Such influence campaigns came to prominence with Russian interference in the US Presidential Election in 2016 ([Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2017](#)). In 2018, Twitter’s Elections Integrity Initiative released a public dataset detailing the behavior of thousands of troll accounts from the Kremlin-based Internet Research Agency (IRA). As a result, analysts have shown that IRA accounts used Twitter to overwhelmingly support the Trump campaign over the Clinton campaign ([Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2017](#); [Tucker et al. 2018](#); [Linvill et al. 2019](#)). Although new evidence suggests that these IRA activities did not successfully polarize Americans ([Bail et al. 2020](#)), trolls posted a wide variety of content in *attempts* to amplify existing social divisions between liberals and conservatives.

Understanding the range of strategies on Twitter as part of Russian foreign influence is important, yet prior work has focused on explicitly partisan messaging. In contrast, here we describe the use of apolitical content in the 2016 US election, and note its potential use as a strategy for foreign influence. We test the hypothesis that autocratic regimes might use the same techniques in foreign operations that they use in domestic ones. In particular, we consider the technique sometimes called ‘flooding,’ where government-sponsored actors inundate social media communities with innocuous or entertainment content to distract or confuse users ([Roberts 2018](#); [Sanovich, Stukal and Tucker 2018](#); [Tucker et al. 2017](#); [Munger et al. 2019](#)). Flooding is an important tool in an autocrat’s domestic playbook, but here we provide evidence that (often ignored) apolitical content on social media might also be a well-practiced tool for foreign influence. On social media platforms in the U.S. context, it is possible for a very large increase in apolitical content in user feeds to displace and/or distract from more mobilizing content, and, through this, dilute political messaging during

an election campaign.

We present descriptive results using a new method of automated text analysis and online crowd-sourcing to identify apolitical content in the Twitter IRA dataset from 2015 until the 2016 election. We show that apolitical content was used asymmetrically across groups – it was commonly used in their artificial liberal community constructed by the IRA trolls (largely tweeting Black Lives Matter related content) and, by election time, rarely used in their artificial conservative community (largely tweeting pro Trump content). Further, we find descriptive evidence for an abrupt change in strategy near the election. Trolls posted large volumes of entertainment and sports content in their liberal community, while simultaneously posting purely political content in their *conservative* community.

Finally, we compare this possible entertainment “flooding” to more explicit and direct forms of voter suppression, especially tweets encouraging election boycotts or discouraging users to vote. We find that this activity was rare. It’s possible that IRA Trolls, fearful that explicit voter suppression tweets would lead to detection and deletion, relied on flooding (and possible displacement of political content) instead. At the same time, the complete IRA troll strategy is difficult to know – it’s possible that some behaviors were unintentional and/or not coordinated across agents, for example – and there may be other reasons driving the use of apolitical content, which we note is a fruitful area for future research.

Our contribution is twofold. First, we evaluate whether well-established theories of authoritarian influence over domestic audiences might also apply to foreign interference via social media. While descriptive, our systematic analysis sheds new light on autocratic efforts in exploiting new technology, and highlights the potential importance of autocratic regimes’ accumulated expertise in information campaigns. Second, our results have essential implications for future research on foreign election interference. Prior studies have typically subset the sample of IRA accounts, and only analyzed tweets using specific partisan slogans or keywords. Such research informs us about explicit targeted messaging, but overlooks the

potentially strategic use of apolitical content.

## Strategic Use of Apolitical Content

Non-democratic regimes typically seek to control their populations’ political activities on social media, often through internet access restrictions and online censorship.<sup>1</sup> Recently, autocratic governments are also relying on the use of coordinated, counter-information campaigns. Flooding is one prominent technique in these efforts (Roberts 2018; Sanovich, Stukal and Tucker 2018; Munger et al. 2019). Its use is well known in China, where government-affiliated users have fabricated posts in attempts to shift online discussions away from controversial issues, often using Chinese history and inspirational quotes (King, Pan and Roberts 2017).

But Russia and Venezuela have also used flooding to discourage domestic coordination (Østbø 2017; Munger et al. 2019). For example, to de-mobilize its domestic population in 2014 after the Crimea annexation, Russian pro-regime social media accounts switched from aggressive hate speech against the opposition to posting sad and empathetic content (Østbø 2017). In Venezuela, Munger et al. (2019) show during the anti-Maduro regime protests in 2014, the government purposefully flooded Twitter with apolitical posts that were unrelated to opposition criticism, in addition to their pro-regime cheerleading. While prior work has studied “flooding” by non-democratic regimes on their own populations (see Keremoğlu and Weidmann (2020) for a recent review), we contribute by studying how actors may apply this tactic to a foreign population. In particular, we consider the hypothesis that foreign government-sponsored trolls use innocuous or entertainment content in attempts to selectively manipulate levels of attention to politics in the United States. We evaluate whether

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<sup>1</sup>These “first and second generation strategies” (Deibert et al. 2010) are most successful in regimes that have a near monopoly on internet access.

trolls might flood *specific* populations on social media with apolitical content, perhaps to distract from and/or displace political content just before an election.

Finally, while we note an alternative use of apolitical content – namely to attract followers – early in the election, we also show asymmetric patterns across liberal and conservative trolls later on, indicating a more complex strategy.

## Data and Methods

In this research note, we use text scaling and hand labeling to score and categorize apolitical messages by trolls over the course of the campaign. Our analyses focus specifically on identifying and measuring apolitical content that *could* be used in attempts to distract and de-mobilize American voting blocs. We describe our data and text scaling method below, while a more extensive description of our methods can be found in the online appendix. All of our analyses can be easily replicated using publicly available data and to-be-released R code.

### Data

Our data comes from three sources: 1) Twitter’s own release of a complete dataset of Russian troll *tweets* and *account* descriptions (available here: <https://transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html>), to which we incorporate 2) Linvill and Warren (2020)’s hand labels of *accounts* (available here: <https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/russian-troll-tweets>)<sup>2</sup>, and 3) hand coded labels of *tweets* we collected through Amazon

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<sup>2</sup>Linvill and Warren report a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.92 on a sub-sample of their labeled handles. This high inter-rater reliability is in line with expectations from our own analysis of the troll network – we show in the appendix that their codes are nearly the same as what would be obtained through automated community detection on the troll network.

Mechanical Turk and Figure Eight (labels will be made available in replication materials).

Twitter’s Elections Integrity Initiative released their public data set in late 2018. It initially contained more than 10 million tweets sent by 3,841 accounts affiliated with the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Kremlin-based Russian troll farm. These accounts represent the efforts of human-controlled Russian operators, or “trolls,” as opposed to computer-controlled accounts, or “bots”. The list was compiled by Twitter based on number of factors, including account origin and IP, account activity, and internal review of accounts. These accounts also appear to be relatively coordinated, in that they formed tight clusters of interacting accounts (see Figure A17 in the SI), which may have contributed to both increased influence (the accounts promoted each other) and later discovery. While most likely not the full universe of foreign accounts, this data is the most comprehensive source available to researchers and consists of a set active and influential IRA accounts, that are coded with a reasonable degree of reliability.<sup>3</sup> This exact dataset is also employed by similar studies on the topic, and so provides a degree of replication across studies.

We link the Twitter data release to Linvill and Warren’s (2020) account categories using tweet IDs.<sup>4</sup> Linvill and Warren (2020) use expert hand coding to classify accounts into the following categories, which we adopt (and validate using community detection in the appendix): Right Troll, Left Troll, News Feed, and Hashtag Gamer. At a high level, right trolls posted right-leaning, populist, and nativist messages as well as about Trump, and left

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<sup>3</sup>For more information on Twitter’s internal coding, see Edgett (2017). To our knowledge, and building on prior studies that have used this data, there is no evidence that Twitter purposefully omitted specific accounts from the public dataset (that would bias our findings). It is possible that Twitter missed infrequent accounts, or accounts that only posted entertainment content; thus our findings only shed light on strategies by active and influential IRA troll accounts.

<sup>4</sup>Twitter’s data included the complete histories of the troll accounts, and this linking allowed us to assign categories to all users in that data with at least one of tweet appearing in the Linvill and Warren data.

trolls tweeted support of the left, socially liberal values, and Black Lives Matter<sup>5</sup>; we refer to these as conservative and liberal accounts throughout our analysis. Accounts labeled as news feed mimicked local news stations and served as news aggregators, and hashtag gamer accounts promoted various hashtags, both divisive and apolitical.<sup>6</sup>

We analyze tweets in Twitter’s official data set that were posted or retweeted by the troll accounts<sup>7</sup> before the election on November 8, 2016. We also remove non-English accounts, for example those using the Russian alphabet. In the main text, we focus our text analysis on troll messaging during the general election, and so present analyses based on tweets posted after January 1, 2016 – further analyses are included in the appendix. For hand labeled data, we studied tweets posted after the end of the Republican presidential primary (starting our analysis in June 2016), but we also present longer time series based on our hand coded labels in the online appendix.

Because prior work has inferred that Russian trolls promoted Republicans over Democrats, and so might have had different messaging goals for Republican-leaning versus Democratic-leaning communities, we analyze two sets of tweets: 1) all tweets, excluding news aggregators, and 2) tweets within liberal and conservative clusters.

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<sup>5</sup>Much of the liberal content by the trolls was related to the Black Lives Matter movement. However, trolls only very rarely drew content from the national BLM organizational account “[blkivesmatter](#)”, for example – trolls retweeted only 10 out of 446 tweets originating from that official Twitter account in 2016. We collected these historical tweets using the “twint” app – <https://github.com/twintproject/twint>. Similarly, trolls retweeted “[aliciagarza](#)”, “[OsopePatrisse](#)”, and “[opalayo](#)” on Twitter (BLM founders highly active on Twitter) a total of 31 times. Similarly, the clusters retweeted Hillary Clinton only 198 times across all troll accounts (49 unique tweets) and Donald Trump 831 times (475 unique tweets).

<sup>6</sup>We omit small categories that were largely inactive; see appendix for those results.

<sup>7</sup>The data set released by Twitter did not include ‘liked’ content.

## Methods

Our ultimate findings rely on analyses of hand labeled tweets. However, we use automated text analysis to identify the kinds of language that would fit the description of “flooding” previously used by authoritarian regimes. In China, for example, users posted positive comments about Chinese history (King, Pan and Roberts 2017). We do not expect Russian trolls to discuss Chinese history to flood American social media, and so we need some means to determine what topics they might have promoted instead. We first analyzed the text using scaling, and then we repeated those analyses using hand coded categories. Thanks to insights from the initial text analysis, we can provide coding instructions in clear and simple terms; this practice is also recommended by prior work (Benoit et al. 2016).

### Automated text analysis

The method for automated text analysis that we use, called pivoted text scaling (Hobbs 2019), is a form of principal component analysis on word co-occurrences. The method is closely related to many standard methods in automated text analysis, including topic models, and it is designed for corpora of short texts in which many documents might contain only common words. The method measures variation in the use of very common words rather than highly specific words to capture particularly broad patterns in (short) texts. We explain the procedure in detail in the online appendix. In short, PCA is conducted on a standardized and truncated word co-occurrence matrix, and its top dimensions are the vectors that explain the greatest variance in that word co-occurrence matrix. From this, each word is assigned a vector of numbers representing its locations on several dimensions (i.e., a vector of scores), and documents are then scored using the average of their words’ scores. The main difference between this method and a topic model, for our purposes here, is that this text scaling estimates very broad and low-dimensional variation in word usage (e.g. liberal-conservative, political-not political) rather than more high-dimensional and highly clustered word usage



(e.g. separate issues like immigration or climate change that might use especially distinct language<sup>8</sup>).<sup>9</sup>

With the top dimensions of the PCA output (specifically, the top two dimensions explaining the most variation in common word use), we identify two theoretically relevant latent variables to analyze and validate with crowd-sourced hand coding: 1) a *partisan dimension*, which for example separates the Linvill and Warren conservative accounts from liberal accounts, and 2) a possible ‘*flooding*’ *dimension* (or, concretely, a politics versus not politics dimension), in which left-leaning trolls post American entertainment content, such as tweets about popular music.

These latent dimensions can be constructed using addition and subtraction of principal components – although scaling in political science is often used to identify a top partisan dimension, there is no guarantee that a top dimension of an unsupervised scaling will capture a specific latent variable of interest.

The partisan dimension shown in the main text is the 2nd dimension in appendix Table A5 and the politics versus not politics (flooding) dimension shown in the main text is the 1st dimension plus the 2nd dimension in appendix Table A6, both of which have the same over time patterns and qualitatively similar keywords.

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<sup>8</sup>Topic models are typically used with strong priors in order to identify highly clustered word usage.

<sup>9</sup>This analysis requires some pre-processing when converting text into a term-document matrix. For this, we used the default text processing settings in the R package ‘stm,’ (<https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/stm/index.html>) but did not ‘stem’ words so that tables were easier to read. We also did not remove hashtags (which improve searchability and are often used to link content to an ongoing conversation on Twitter) or user mentions (i.e. the account promoted in the tweet).

## Hand label analysis

After identifying relevant topics, we analyze the data using hand labeled tweets. This analysis of hand labeled tweets assesses whether we see the same *over time* patterns in politics versus entertainment when using human coders to assess tweet content.

It also places our text scaling estimates onto a more interpretable scale – the proportion of documents about politics or entertainment. In this analysis, we report the level of agreement among raters at the tweet level (which is moderate, especially compared to what might be seen for much more concrete labels) to note some subjectivity and likely measurement error in the human labels, but our tests focus on over time *averages* in topics of tweeted content. We then incorporate uncertainty in the labels using a linear regression – the labels enter as our dependent variable, and standard errors from linear regressions incorporate measurement error in the dependent variable. However, these estimates can still be biased downwards if we have error in the *independent* variable (such as in the left versus right troll classification), and if hand coders provide uniform, random responses that do not reflect the prevalence of a label (we use majority labels to combat this possibility).

To collect hand labels, we designed a human coding exercise completed by workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (hosted on the crowdsourcing platform Figure Eight; see appendix). We asked human workers to read individual tweets, and sort them into four categories: i) Politics and Elections, ii) Social Justice and Race Relations, iii) Entertainment, and iv) Unclear/Other. The workers coded a random sample of 900 tweets – 450 from right trolls and another 450 from left trolls – and each of these tweets was categorized by three independent individuals.

Tweets were assigned a topic when two out of three coders chose that topic.<sup>10</sup> This

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<sup>10</sup>However, as we show in Table 1, this does not appear to affect our results, since we see the same shifts for all labels (not just majority labels).

follows recommendations to use multiple coders in crowd-sourced tasks, since this helps reduce noise in the labels provided by online workers (Benoit et al. 2016) – noise which might reflect worker attention and quality rather than features of the text data.<sup>11</sup>

To evaluate systematic agreement for the *majority* categories assigned by coders (as we’ll use in the analysis), we trained a supervised model<sup>12</sup> on 50% of the hand labeled data and predicted the remaining labels. Across 1000 replicates, we observe an average intraclass correlation (human versus machine) of 0.65 for entertainment (AUC: 0.89), 0.74 for politics (AUC: 0.92), and 0.58 for social justice and race relations (AUC: 0.86).<sup>13</sup> More importantly – beyond validating that there is systematic agreement in the human coding for these categories – we also show in the appendix that our supervised models produce probabilities that match the observed category proportions in hand labels (as recommended by Card and North (2018)), and that analyses based on hand labels alone do not substantively differ from the supervised ones. With the supervised labels, we track activity over a longer period of time (see appendix Figures A14 and A15) and more precisely at frequent intervals.

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<sup>11</sup>Here, we observe Fleiss’ Kappa of around 0.4 for all workers and categories (i.e. not using the 2 out of 3 agreement). Krippendorff’s alpha was also approximately 0.4. Note that this measures the level of consensus among raters at the tweet level, which we would expect to be lower for broad and subjective categories (e.g. “is this statement political”?) than for highly specific ones (e.g. “does this statement use the word ‘politics’”). This measure can be low without affecting the validity of the over-time *averages* in proportions of tweeted content. However, uniform, random answers by some crowd workers would push topic averages toward 1 over the number of categories, and labeling using majority vote can help reduce this bias.

<sup>12</sup>We used an  $l1$  penalized logistic regression on word embeddings produced by our text scaling, using data from 2015 through 2016, and, in the appendix, we also use GloVe word embeddings (Pennington, Socher and Manning 2014) that we trained on the same Twitter data as a robustness check. Analyzed labels were trained on the full labeled data. See appendix for details.

<sup>13</sup>Standard deviations for the intraclass correlations over these split samples were 0.02 (entertainment), 0.02 (politics), and 0.03 (social justice and race relations).

# Results

## Recruitment and Politicization

Our results construct a timeline of text-based strategies used over the course of the campaign to demonstrate the various uses of apolitical content. First, we confirm that apolitical content was used in recruitment, supplementing findings in prior work (Tucker et al. 2018; Dawson and Innes 2019; Linvill et al. 2019). Based on account categories released by Linvill and Warren (2020), along with our validation of those categories using network community detection (see appendix), we combine the IRA clusters into two main categories: polarized accounts (either liberal or conservative) and ambiguous accounts (no clear ideological messaging), in addition to the local news accounts that primarily tweeted links rather than other users' content.

Prior work has documented general patterns of troll activity; our analysis confirms the same. For the sake of comparison, Figure A10 in the appendix plots the number of tweets posted by each cluster from June 2015. Over time, we see a reliance on local news and ambiguous accounts until fall of 2016, at which point there is a significant increase in activity of polarized accounts. The lower panel of this figure shows that ambiguous accounts mentioned non-trolls at extreme rates in 2015, suggesting a massive effort to contact and/or recruit Americans to follow the troll accounts.

Past studies have generally concluded that IRA troll accounts posted political content, namely propaganda, designed to divide, incite, and agitate viewers on both side of the political spectrum (Bastos and Farkas 2019). They have also observed sharp increases in the tweeting of conservative content in September 2016 (Howard et al. 2018). Similarly, the red line in Figure 1 documents a late-campaign surge toward conservative content in our data, and we also see a partisan divide in messaging through much of 2016. Our results also speak to recent work showing distinct differences in hyperlink content sharing among liberal and

conservative IRA accounts in the 2016 elections (Golovchenko et al. 2020). Figure A16 in the appendix shows estimates within account (i.e. centered at account means).

### Selective Use of Apolitical Content


Our results next demonstrate the asymmetric use of apolitical content. The secretive nature of foreign interference makes it difficult to definitely determine the motives behind the specific behavior of IRA troll accounts, who appear to have had goals of both increasing support for Trump as well as sowing partisan divisions (Tucker et al. 2018). But we believe we can learn from prior studies that have shown that social media can actively mobilize populations, from pro-democratic protests (Tucker et al. 2017) to turning out to vote (Bond et al. 2012; Fowler et al. 2021), as well as work on flooding in authoritarian regimes, which argue that apolitical content is used as a demobilization strategy (Roberts 2018; Sanovich, Stukal and Tucker 2018; Østbø 2017; Munger et al. 2019).

In this light, we consider evidence for a possible strategy using apolitical content – for demobilization, or perhaps distraction from and displacement of political content – focusing on the #BlackLivesMatter campaign. The IRA attempted to capitalize on racial and partisan divides surrounding the campaign by posting BLM content on Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, and Instagram, among others (Howard et al. 2018). We show that this entertainment “flooding” content was more common in the trolls’ artificial liberal community, and that these accounts switched further to entertainment content near the 2016 election. In contrast, during this switch, the trolls’ conservative community posted consistently political content.

The blue line in the top panel of Figure 1 demonstrates that while left-leaning accounts were actively tweeting about BLM content in the summer and early fall of 2016, they were, as a fraction of all content, *less likely* to tweet such content near the end of the campaign. Because this shift could be explained by an increase in 2016 election content without a

**Most  
“conservative”  
words:**

trumpforpresident  
makeamericagreatagain  
perfectsliders  
invotingbecause  
trump  
trump Pence  
trump train  
hillaryforprison  
votetrump  
gopdebatesc  
draintheswamp  
giselleevns  
johnatrs  
maga  
lockherup




**Most  
“liberal”  
words:**

unarmed  
fatally  
police  
officer  
benandjerrysnewflavor  
bleepthepolice  
cop  
policebrutality  
blacklivesmatter  
acab  
shot  
pauloneal  
btp  
shooting  
trueblacknews

**Most  
“political”  
words:**

unarmed  
wholeheartedly  
benandjerrysnewflavor  
mariowoods  
fatally  
danielharris  
fixthepolice  
acab  
policebrutality  
officer  
btp  
police  
bleepthepolice  
fggot  
cop

**Left trolls only**



**Most  
“non-political”  
words:**

rapstationradio  
feat  
nowplaying  
indieradioplay  
httpstcoemxjgtvv  
torae  
hiphop  
music  
scarface  
nineoh  
album  
rap  
-fr-o  
remix  
checkitout

Figure 1: *Consistently Political Conservative Content and a Shift Away from Political Liberal Content.* The top panel shows the average text scores on the dimension of the overall text scaling that we labeled the “partisan” dimension (this is the 2nd dimension, opposed to the 1st which captured Twitter hashtags versus mentions). Conservative accounts tweeted consistently right-leaning content during the campaign. The bottom panel displays the top dimensions of the analysis subset to liberal trolls, and shows that liberal imitators instead increased entertainment content relative to social justice and politics close to election time. We use the above dimensions, keywords, and our interpretations of them (in quotes) to create labeling instructions in follow-up human coding.

corresponding shift toward apolitical content, the bottom panel of Figure 1 explores this in further detail by examining left troll IRA accounts only. Here, it's clear these accounts switched to using apolitical content (talking about music and videos) instead of political or divisive content. This 'flooding' may have been used to distract, demobilize, or displace political content, though we can't distinguish among these motivations or the actual effects of posts with the data available. But these patterns demonstrate a clear and asymmetric use of apolitical content.

### **Hand Label Analysis**

We validate these results by analyzing average labels in hand-labeled tweets. This analysis is important because it evaluates whether human raters who have read the tweets are, in aggregate, able to perceive 1) a difference in average levels of political content across left and right trolls, and 2) a decline in political content, in that we can see a substantial decline in the averages of their political labels.

In Table 1, we show linear regressions for changes in political content among left trolls and right trolls. This analysis is limited to the random sample of tweets for which we collected hand labels, and, given that the labels enter as our dependent variable, the confidence intervals in this regression account for measurement error in the labels. We also measure our dependent variable in two ways: first, the fraction of labels that were either politics or social justice, and second, an indicator variable (0/1) if the majority of coders labeled a tweet as being about 'politics' or a majority labeled it about 'social justice / race relations'.

Overall, the table shows that there was a statistically significant decline in political content only among the left trolls (-0.19 percentage points, 95% CI: -0.28 to -0.10) for tweets with 2 out of 3 labels (listing politics or social justice/race relations). This effect represents an approximately 30% decline in political content compared to tweets from June through September. Note that this result is no different if we instead use the 'entertainment'

label as the dependent variable.

Figure 2 below, as well as Figures A5 and A6 in the appendix, present this result in more detail, focusing on the 2 out of 3 hand label averages *by month*, as well as the averaged predicted probabilities (from the supervised model) *by week*. They show the same over-time patterns as the pivoted text scaling, which are all consistent with distraction-based messaging. We can further see that the artificial liberal community was less likely to discuss politics or social justice than the artificial conservative community, even before the late campaign shift away from political discussion (Figure A16 in the appendix show this shift within accounts). Finally, the top-right of Figure 2 shows a spike in *number* of tweets both right troll and left troll content in the month or two preceding the 2016 election. Right trolls maintained political content during a spike in content, while left trolls shifted toward entertainment content. We do not have an interpretation for the different timings of these spikes.

### **Explicitly Demobilizing Language**

We can also use this same data to look at an explicit strategy to demobilize, which would involve tweets that actively discourage users to participate in the election (“boycott the election,” or “do not vote”). In contrast to flooding, this is perhaps the most transparent and direct form of demobilization. The existence of voter suppression tweets has been documented (Howard et al. 2018), but studies have not focused on their usage over time. We explore to what extent the IRA used a strategy of direct voter suppression, by looking for mentions of voting keywords (such as ‘vote’, ‘voting’, ‘election’, ‘support’) as well as negation phrases (such as “not”, “n’t”, “boycott”, “sit out”, “truth”, “rigged”, “before”, “illegal”). The additional negation words cover phrases identified by prior studies (DiResta et al. 2019; Howard et al. 2018; Kim 2018), as examples of demobilization from suppression (for more discussion, see appendix).



**Politics and/or social justice/race relations content**

	<i>Left Trolls</i>		<i>Right Trolls</i>	
	Fraction of labels (1)	Majority labels (2)	Fraction (3)	Majority (4)
Oct.-Nov. '16 compared to June-Sept.	-0.16 (-0.24, -0.09) p < 0.001	-0.19 (-0.28, -0.10) p < 0.001	0.04 (-0.03, 0.11) p = 0.32	0.02 (-0.07, 0.11) p = 0.64
Intercept	0.58 (0.52, 0.63) p < 0.001	0.54 (0.47, 0.61) p < 0.001	0.76 (0.73, 0.80) p < 0.001	0.75 (0.70, 0.80) p < 0.001
Number of tweets	450	450	450	450

Table 1: *Decline in political content among left trolls (linear regression on hand labels)*. This table displays linear regressions estimating changes in averages of tweets that were labeled as ‘politics’ or ‘social justice/race relations’, comparing the months October and November 2016 to June through September 2016 (the full time span of hand labeled tweets). We display multiple models. The dependent variable in the ‘fraction of labels’ columns are the fraction of labels that were either politics or social justice. The ‘majority’ columns are indicators for either a majority of coders labeling a tweet as being about ‘politics’ or a majority labeling it about ‘social justice / race relations’.




Figure 2: *Hand Labeled Results*. Top-left panel shows proportion of tweets per topic from a sample of hand-coded tweets, and bottom row shows the results from applying a supervised model to label the full corpus. Top-right panel shows the number of tweets from left and right trolls. Note that right trolls did not change content when increasing posting frequency.

In Figure 3, we show that overall voter suppression tweets are rare, especially compared to entertainment content. In addition, trolls on the left rarely discussed voting at all (positively or negatively) compared to right-leaning trolls. Yet the lack of direct voter suppression tweets may explain the high volume of apolitical flooding – this could potentially be driven by policing on the platform. We know Russian IRA accounts spent time and effort to adopt American personas and develop followers (Dawson and Innes 2019; Schafer 2018); troll accounts that feared detection and deletion by Twitter may be less likely to engage in direct and obvious voter suppression.

This again highlights an important comparative consideration for research on foreign influence compared to work on domestic authoritarian flooding. In authoritarian regimes, the state has tight control over the media market; in contrast, the US social media environment is a competitive market where numerous actors compete for the attention of users. Even if the goal was to polarize American citizens, IRA accounts needed to both attract and influence users without immediate detection and removal.

## Conclusion

When the Twitter IRA data was first released in 2018, one puzzling finding was that much of the content posted by Russian trolls was seemingly apolitical – “camouflage” tweets with no clear connection to an IRA agenda, or social content such as recipes or celebrity gossip (Linvill et al. 2019) – and potentially designed to attract followers (Tucker et al. 2018). We consider here whether apolitical content might also be a strategy for foreign interference, and use our data to document previously overlooked patterns of IRA troll behavior. Thus one of our contributions is methodological – past research has studied the tweets of IRA trolls by focusing explicitly on divisive content, and subsetting data samples using specific political or partisan keywords. In doing so, scholars could be omitting any consideration of apolitical




Figure 3: *Voting and voter suppression.* This figure shows that the right trolls mentioned "vote", "election", "support" in around 35% of tweets in the week leading up to the election, while the left trolls tweeted these words in slightly over 10% of tweets. Left trolls were not more likely to negate or use negative sentiment (here, the fraction of tweets with average AFINN scores (Nielsen 2011) less than 0) in their tweets about voting.

content, which might form part of a foreign agent's strategy.

We also contribute to the literature by testing autocratic theories of social media "flooding" (Roberts 2018; Sanovich, Stukal and Tucker 2018; Østbø 2017; Munger et al. 2019) as an example of foreign interference in the US election. We find that while right-leaning and moderate trolls distributed political content to followers in support of Donald Trump,

left-leaning trolls were more likely to use apolitical messaging toward liberal constituents, especially close to the election. In contrast with past work, our results suggest that direct efforts to demobilize, such as mentions of difficulty voting or opposition to Hillary Clinton, might have been secondary to indirect efforts to distract.

We hope these descriptive analyses lay the ground for future research. Going forward, the results demonstrate the need for scholars and policymakers to not only focus on active, divisive messaging in foreign election interference, but to consider the broader set of tools used by authoritarian regimes in their domestic and foreign influence campaigns.

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**Supplemental Information for “Asymmetric Flooding as a Tool for  
Foreign Influence on Social Media”**

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# A Data

Our data comes from three sources:

1. Twitter’s own release of Russian troll *tweets* (available here: <https://transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html>),
2. [Linville and Warren \(2020\)](#)’s hand *labels of accounts* (available here: <https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/russian-troll-tweets>),
3. Hand coded *labels of tweets* we collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Figure Eight (data will be made available in replication materials).

## A.1 Twitter’s Official Tweet and Account Information Data Set

Twitter’s Elections Integrity Initiative released public data sets in 2017 and 2018 containing the propaganda efforts led by the Internet Research Agency, a so-called “troll factory” reportedly linked to the Russian government (Bertrand, 2017). The data sets contain more than 9 million tweets sent by over 3,600 accounts affiliated with the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Kremlin-based Russian troll farm. These accounts represent the efforts of human-controlled Russian operators, or “trolls”, as opposed to computer-controlled accounts (or “bots”). Out of these accounts, Twitter originally established that 2752 were operated by the IRA (United States Senate Committee, 2017). In January 2018, this list was expanded to include 3814 IRA-linked accounts (Twitter, 2018b), of which over 3,600 are still identified by Twitter as IRA-linked accounts. We use the combined data released in 2018 and available here under “Internet Research Agency” (enter email at bottom to access): <https://transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html>.

The released data contains all tweets and metadata, as well as profile information, for all IRA-linked accounts. Tweets and metadata contain the full text of a tweet, including

hashtags, user mentions, and links (which are part of the tweet text), as well as time posted and whether the tweet was a “retweet.” Note that some retweets originate from other trolls, and some tweets that are not retweets are also not original texts – they can originate from other sources without a reference to those sources.

The data also contains numerous posted images and videos (274 gigabytes). The images are not directly studied in our analysis, but accompanying tweet texts are included in our text analyses. For example, if a user posts a photo/link to photo and comments on the photo/link to photo, then the comment is included in our analysis.

Note the data set released by Twitter does not include ‘liked’ tweets – i.e. tweets posted by other accounts that the trolls then clicked on to “like” without actually retweeting.

Many of the 9 million tweets were posted after the election or were not in English. In section [A.4](#) below, we describe the removal of post-election tweets and tweets not in English.

## **A.2 Linvill and Warren Account Categories**

[Linvill and Warren \(2020\)](#) use unrestricted open coding to classify accounts into categories: Right Troll, Left Troll, News Feed, Hashtag Gamer, Fearmonger, Commercial, Unknown, and Non-English. Right Trolls posted right-leaning, populist, and nativist messages as well as about Trump; Left Trolls tweeted support of the left, socially liberal values, and Black Lives Matter; News Feed accounts mimicked local news stations and served as news aggregators; Hashtag Gamer accounts posted hashtag games to promote various hashtags; and Fearmonger accounts promoted a specific instance of fake news, related to salmonella-contaminated turkeys, near the 2015 Thanksgiving holiday.

We use four of the categories (Right Troll, Left Troll, News Feed, Hashtag Gamer) because the remaining accounts were largely inactive in 2016 or did not tweet in English (see [Figure A10](#) for numbers of tweets, and [Figure A1](#) for results including all English language categories active at all in 2016). Throughout our analysis, we refer to Right Troll accounts

as conservative accounts, and Left Troll accounts as liberal accounts.

### **A.3 Our Hand-Coded Tweet Categories**

To validate the text scaling method we used to identify categories of apolitical language, we hired Amazon Turk users to code a random sample of 450 left and 450 right account (see [A.2](#)) tweets posted between June 2016 and the 2016 election. This hand coding process is described in detail in section [C.1](#). We then use supervised machine learning (see [C.2](#)) to label the remainder of the tweets in Twitter’s IRA data (described above), including news and “hashtag gamer” tweets. Note, however, that inferences based on the supervised labels did not substantively differ from the hand labeled data alone – we are simply able to study more tweets and accounts over a longer time period. We compare these results in section [C](#) below.

### **A.4 Data Merge and Processing Details**

#### **A.4.1 Merging Twitter Official Release to Account Categories**

In all of our analyses, we use the data set released by Twitter itself. Twitter’s data included the complete histories of the troll accounts, while researcher collected data (both our own and the publicly available Linvill and Warren data) would typically be limited by Twitter’s API constraints.<sup>14</sup>

The data in Twitter’s release was partially anonymized – the user IDs of accounts with fewer than 5,000 followers were replaced with hashed versions of the user IDs. This prevents us from linking the Linvill and Warren account categories based on user ID alone.

However, Twitter’s data set was not anonymized on any other identifiers, including tweet

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<sup>14</sup>The Linvill Warren data contains just over 1 million tweets from before the 2016 election and from accounts using English. We add around 1 million tweets to their corpus using this merge procedure.

IDs. Because the Tweet IDs are unique, and unique to a user, linking on tweet IDs allowed us assign user categories to all users appearing in the Twitter data, as long as at least one of their tweets appeared in the Linvill and Warren data. We illustrate this merger below (Table A1).

Twitter’s Data			LW’s Data		
user ID (hashed)	tweet ID		user ID	tweet ID	acct. category
X	1		a	1	left troll
X	2				
Y	3		b	3	hashtag gamer
Y	4				

Merged Analysis Data		
user ID	tweet ID	acct. category
X	1	left troll
X	2	left troll
Y	3	hashtag gamer
Y	4	hashtag gamer

Table A1: *Example Twitter - Linvill Warren data merger.* Data were merged using the tweet ID column.

#### A.4.2 Pre-Election, English-Speaking Data

We analyze tweets in Twitter’s official data set that were posted or retweeted by the troll accounts before the election on November 8, 2016. We also remove non-English accounts, for example those using the Russian alphabet.<sup>15</sup> In the main text, we focus our text analysis on troll messaging during the general election, and so present analyses based on tweets posted after January 1, 2016 – further analyses are included in the appendix. For hand labeled data,

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<sup>15</sup>Non-English accounts: 1) account language set to language other than English, 2) labeled non-English by Linvill Warren, 3) account description with UTF-8 characters in integer range 1000 to 1999 (R code applied to user profile description: `any(utf8ToInt(x) %in% 1000:1999)`). We also included accounts as English accounts if they were *not* labeled non-English by Linvill Warren.

we studied tweets posted after the end of the Republican presidential primary (starting our analysis in June 2016), but we also present longer time series based on our hand coded labels in Section D.3.

Table A2 shows the reductions in sample size after removing post-election and non-English accounts, as well as tweets without any content after text processing (see Section A.4.5) and a match to the Linvill Warren account labels. Most of the data is removed by the pre-election English language restrictions.

Twitter’s official data set	N tweets	N accounts with tweets
All IRA Tweets	9,041,308	3,667
+ Pre-Election	7,053,777	3,235
+ Any Content after Text Processing	6,332,480	3,234
+ English	2,657,397	1,905
+ Linvill Warren accounts	2,282,142	1,135

Table A2: *Sample Sizes*. This table shows the numbers of tweets and accounts remaining after subsetting the Twitter data set to pre-election tweets, English language tweets and accounts, processing with defaults in R package “stm”, and overlap with the Linvill Warren hand labels. The largest reduction in sample size came from the removal of non-English tweets. Note that a small number of these accounts were no longer in Twitter’s official data set as of March 2020 (3,613 accounts).

### A.4.3 Data Subsets and Training Sets

Because prior work has established that Russian trolls promoted Republicans over Democrats, and so might have had different messaging goals for their artificial Republican-leaning versus Democratic-leaning communities, we analyze two sets of tweets: 1) all pre-election tweets, and 2) pre-election tweets within liberal and conservative clusters.

In text scaling model *training*, we further hold out a) “news aggregators” because they posted large volumes of spam-like and repetitive content,<sup>16</sup> and b) for models that we inter-

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<sup>16</sup>Tweets from the “news aggregators” are then scored using models trained on the less repetitive data from other accounts.



pret directly (rather than through hand labels), content posted prior to 2016, since we were primarily concerned with messaging around the 2016 election. Table A3 shows the training sets for each analysis in this paper.

Section D.3 contains a full timeline of tweet categories based on our hand coded categories and text scaling from 2015 through 2016 (content prior to 2015 was very sparse, as shown in Figure A10). Other work has documented recruitment strategies used by trolls and imitation of local news outlets, as well as their campaigns before and after 2016 presidential election (Tucker et al. 2018). However, see Section D.3 for the analysis of tweets posted in 2015, many of which tweets appeared to concern Ukraine.

<b>Analyses Using Text Scaling Output as Outcome</b>	
Scores applied to:	Scores trained on:
All tweets pre-election in 2016	All tweets pre-election in 2016, excluding news aggregators
Left troll tweets pre-election in 2016	Left troll tweets pre-election in 2016
(in SI) Right troll tweets pre-election in 2016	Right troll tweets pre-election in 2016
<b>Analyses Using Hand Labels as Outcome</b>	
Scores/embeddings applied to:	Scores/embeddings trained on:
All tweets pre-election	All tweets pre-election, excluding news aggregators

Table A3: *Text Scaling Training Sets*. When using text scaling as the outcome (i.e. when we interpret the dimensions themselves in 2016), we train the text scaling in 2016 and remove news aggregators (these accounts posted repetitive and spam-like content). When we do not need to interpret dimensions directly– and instead use the text scaling as a word embedding method to assist in the supervised model labeling – we only remove news aggregators from training.

The liberal and conservative clusters were classified by prior work (Linville and Warren 2020) and we validated those labels using community detection on troll user mentions (see appendix). The Mueller Report suggests that Russian operators created politically neutral accounts to gain credibility, and cooperated with each other in teams to amplify messages and appear authentic. Prior studies have also documented high levels of clustering among the IRA accounts (Dawson and Innes 2019; Stewart, Arif and Starbird 2018; Howard et al. 2018).

#### A.4.4 Unit of Analysis

We do not know the number of operators behind the accounts, and the IRA accounts likely functioned within a coordinated unit. As we show in the community detection section below, the accounts are perhaps best considered as clusters of accounts rather than independent accounts, given that they were highly interconnected (and likely coordinated, especially within cluster).

We nonetheless consider within troll account changes in Section D.2 where we center each account at its dimension or category mean. These analyses show that the shifts from politics to entertainment on the left occurred within accounts.

#### A.4.5 Text Processing

Analyzing the tweet text requires some pre-processing of the text when converting text into a document-term matrix.<sup>17</sup> For this, we used the default text processing settings in the R

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<sup>17</sup>This matrix contained one row for each tweet, and one column for each word. An entry for a word was 1 if present in a given document and 0 otherwise.

package “stm,”<sup>1819</sup> but did not ‘stem’ words so that tables were easier to read and because much of the platform-specific language in tweets cannot be easily stemmed. In keeping with those defaults, we also did not remove hashtags (which improve searchability on Twitter and are often used to link content to an ongoing conversation on the site), user mentions (i.e. the accounts promoted in the tweet), or web links.

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<sup>18</sup><https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/stm/index.html>

<sup>19</sup>Default used: convert to lowercase, remove stopwords, remove numbers, remove punctuation, words 3 or more letters only.

## B Text Scaling

We use text scaling to identify the kinds of language that would fit the description of “flooding” previously used by authoritarian regimes. In China, for example, users partly posted positive comments about Chinese history (King, Pan and Roberts 2017). We do not expect Russian trolls to discuss Chinese history to flood American social media, and so we need some way to determine what they might have promoted instead. Once we analyze the text using scaling, we then validate those analyses using hand coded categories. In this, we chose relatively ordinary-sounding categories for coding, and we did not ask human coders to evaluate whether a tweet was distracting. Prior work argues that crowd-sourced tasks must be provided in clear and simple terms, even if broader goals are more abstract (Benoit et al. 2016).

We do not use topic models here because automated selection of the number of topics in these models typically leads to a very large number of topics (e.g. 100). Each of these topics might explain only a small amount of text in a given data set, and we might need to combine a large number of topics to estimate a broad “distraction” category. Although it is possible for researchers to specify very small numbers of topics in model fitting, topic models are not commonly used to estimate only a handful of categories.

As a robustness check, we train a GloVe word embedding model (Pennington, Socher and Manning 2014) on the same IRA Twitter corpus and show that these word embeddings lead to somewhat poorly calibrated supervised models for our hand labels.<sup>20</sup> Despite their relatively poor calibration (they accurately predict *individual* labels but under-fit the hand labeled *proportions* over time), however, the word embedding based results are not substantively

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<sup>20</sup>As noted below, calibration, and the accurate estimation of proportions as opposed to the correct categorization of individual documents, is widely considered the most important metric when evaluating supervised models based on hand labels in social science (Hopkins and King 2010; Card and North 2018), even though measures of precision and recall matter for model efficiency.

different from the text scaling based ones (see Section C.2.6 ).

Ultimately, each of our text analyses, including the supervised models of hand categories, create a dictionary in which each word is assigned a score (e.g. the probability a word is “political”) and each document is the average of its words’ scores.

## B.1 Text Scaling: Explanation of Method

We use a form of principal component analysis, called pivoted text scaling (Hobbs 2019), for text scaling. The method applies singular value decomposition to a standardized and truncated word co-occurrence matrix, and, as in PCA, its right singular values are then used to score words and documents. This approach is closely related to latent semantic analysis (Deerwester et al. 1990) and its many derivatives commonly used in automated text analysis today.




Table A4: *Example Matrix Transformation in Pivoted Text Scaling.* The text scaling used in this paper estimates word vectors using singular value decomposition on a truncated and standardized word co-occurrence matrix (example in bottom-right). Much like principal components, these word scores are the standardized word co-occurrence matrix (representing all words without truncation, bottom-left) multiplied by the right singular vectors of the truncated and standardized co-occurrences (using only the common words’ rows in estimation). Document scores are averages of their words’ scores.

In this, the co-occurrence matrix is the cross product of the document-term matrix. In the document-term matrix, documents are rows and columns are words (with entries the number of a given word in a document). The co-occurrence matrix is symmetric and has words as both rows and columns. As noted above, we do not remove any text from the tweets in this analysis, other than the “stopwords” (e.g. “it”, “the”) removed by default in the widely text analysis package “stm”. Hashtags are words.

Analyzing the word co-occurrences rather than the documents themselves, as we do here, is a standard approach when analyzing short text, such as those found on social media. As examples of this approach for topic models, see the biterm topic model (Yan et al. 2013) and the word network topic model (Zuo, Zhao and Xu 2015).

Standardization controls for word frequency. In this method, the matrix is standardized by taking the square root of each count and then dividing each row by its Euclidean norm. Standardization is almost always used in one way or another in text scaling models. Without this standardization, PCA on a word co-occurrence matrix tends to produce a 1st dimension for the most common word, a 2nd dimension for the 2nd most common word and so on. With the standardization, there is a single dimension (called dimension 0) for word frequency and document length, while subsequent dimensions estimate word polarization.

Truncation, in turn, helps ensure that the top dimensions of the output still capture variation in commonly used language. Following Hobbs (2019), this specifically analyzes the co-occurrences for words that appear more often than their accompanying words. The accompanying words’ co-occurrences contain noisy (i.e. they still contain few words even after aggregation) and duplicated information, since they are rare and already analyzed when they appear in the co-occurrences of the more common words.

Truncating such a matrix is closely related to a technique called sparse principal component analysis (Zou, Hastie and Tibshirani 2006). Sparse PCA estimates a small number of loadings that explain a large amount of variance in a matrix. In text, the sparse load-

ings maximizing explained variance are very often the most common words (Zhang and Ghaoui 2011). Pivoted text scaling makes this sparsification explicit by truncating the word co-occurrence matrix at the point where words on average appear less often than their accompanying words. This sparsification is applied to the rows of the word co-occurrences, and so its right singular values (closely related to PCA loadings, which we will use interchangeably in this context<sup>21</sup>) still estimate the locations of *all* words so that we can score documents that do not use common words.

The top output dimensions of PCA on this matrix are then vectors that explain the greatest variance in the standardized and truncated word co-occurrence matrix. As with principal components, each word is assigned a vector of numbers based on the right singular vectors applied to the standardized word co-occurrence matrix. Lack of truncation in this step scores all words using the principal components of common words.

These vectors represent words’ locations on latent dimensions (semantic vectors).<sup>22</sup> Similar to document scoring using ‘word embeddings’ (Mikolov et al. 2013; Pennington, Socher and Manning 2014), documents are then scored using the average of their words’ scores. Also like standard word embeddings, we use this PCA output (the top 10 dimensions) as input to later supervised models. As a robustness check, we compare those models to ones trained on GloVe word embeddings (Pennington, Socher and Manning 2014).

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<sup>21</sup>In downstream analyses, document scores are scaled to standard deviations and their scales are not interpreted as the amount of variance explained in the document-term matrix. We use hand labels to both validate our categories and create more human-interpretable scales.

<sup>22</sup>The principal components for the words’ “documents” (left singular vectors) are the same as the loadings for common words, but zero for rare words. These vectors are used only for identifying keywords.

## B.2 Text Scaling: Output and Interpretation

As a reminder, we use text scaling to identify the kinds of language that would fit the description of “flooding” previously used by authoritarian regimes. With the top dimensions of the PCA output, we then identify two theoretically relevant latent variables to analyze and validate with crowd-sourced hand coding:

1. A partisan dimension, which for example separates the Linvill and Warren conservative accounts from liberal accounts, and
2. A social de-mobilization dimension, in which trolls post American entertainment content, such as tweets about popular music.

These latent dimensions can be constructed using addition and subtraction of the top two principal components of the overall analysis (all pre-election, English tweets in 2016, excluding news troll spam) and the left troll analysis respectively. Although scaling in political science is often used to identify a top partisan dimension, top dimensions of unsupervised scaling output do not necessarily capture variables of interest.

Here, these variables of interest were the top dimensions of the output. The partisan dimension shown in the main text is the 2nd dimension in Table A5 and the social de-mobilization dimension shown in the main text is 1st dimension plus the 2nd dimension in Table A6. As shown in Figures A9, we observe the same over-time patterns (and similar keywords, see Table A6) in both the 1st dimension and 2nd dimension of the liberal cluster text.

In the tables below, we show the keywords for each of those top two dimensions.<sup>23</sup> In Section C, we validate our labels for the dimensions using the crowd-sourced coding of tweets.

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<sup>23</sup>Keywords are estimated using left singular vectors of the transformed word co-occurrence matrix described in the previous section. See Hobbs (2019) for details.



### B.2.1 Text Scaling: Overall 2016 - keywords

Dimension 1		Dimension 2	
		Conservative	Liberal
giselleevns	gerfingerpoken	trumpforpresident	unarmed
ihatepokemongobecause	thinker	makeamericagreatagain	fatally
danageezus	clinton	perfectsliders	police
hashtag	tcot	invotingbecause	officer
worldofhashtags	httpstcojeaacre	trumpk	benandjerrysnewflavor
midnight	ccot	trumppence	bleepthepolice
eat	joeamerica	trumptrain	cop
thingseveryboywantstohear	maga	hillaryforprison	policebrutality
chrixmorgan	lnyhbt	votetrump	blacklivesmatter
pokemon	petefrt	gopdebatesc	acab
playing	tlot	draintheswamp	shot
ruinadinnerinonephrase	trumptrain	giselleevns	pauloneal
ihateitwhen	pjnet	johnatsrs	btp
onewordoffmoviequotes	poll	maga	shooting
boothprince	rasmussen	lockherup	trueblacknews

Table A5: 2016 Overall Keywords




Figure A1: *Polarization Over Time – all categories*. Note that the categories “fearmonger”, “unknown”, and not labeled at all by Linville Warren rarely posted in 2016. See Figure A10 for a visualization of their activity counts.

### B.2.2 Text Scaling: Left trolls 2016 - keywords and over-time plots

Dimension 1		Dimension 2	
Mobilization	De-Mobilization	Mobilization	De-Mobilization
fatally	indieradioplay	blackskinisnotacrime	rapstationradio
unarmed	httpstcoemxjgtvv	chaimgoldberg	feat
shooting	tycashh	blackoncampus	torae
officer	sinice	red-pilled	hiphop
benandjerrysnewflavor	thetrudz	nowadays	barz
charges	playing	diminish	-fr-o
charged	music	antipolicebrutalityday	scarface
police	nowplaying	istartcryingwhen	nowplaying
pauloneal	listen	beingblackis	checkitout
cop	nineoh	fggot	october
shot	rapstationradio	altonsterling	contest
fixthepolice	boogsmalone	philandocastile	reks
dashcam	recklessdondon	wearhoodiefortrayvon	kass
bulldoze	rdeyeplug	oscarhasnocolor	xzibit
fatal	ogiiiiiy	blackpowerbaby	mixtapemppromo

Table A6: *Left Troll Dimension 1 and 2 Over Time.*




Figure A2: *Left Trolls, Over Time*

### B.2.3 Text Scaling: Right trolls 2016 - keywords and over-time plot

Dimension 1		Dimension 2	
renewus	adjusted	afight	islamkills
islamkills	rasmussen	trumpisright	brussels
afight	incite	crookedcruz	oscarhasnocolor
stopislam	bribe	readily	prayforbrussels
cosproject	lester	trumpwillwin	oscars
jstines	mcclatchy	rkba	stopislam
brussels	statespoll	ctot	refugees
pjnet	ppollingnumbers	lnyhbt	honorforthebrave
irishjoeharriso	holt	perfectlylaura	oscarssowhite
readily	emails	trumparmy	europa
cruzcrew	manager	tgdn	oscar
molonlabe	aide	irishjoeharriso	nocybercensorship
ccot	overcharging	ppsellsbabyparts	terrorists
nra	probe	noliberalbias	textit
makedclisten	allegations	defundpp	religionofpeace

Table A7: *Right Trolls 2016: Keywords*




Figure A3: *Maga Imitators Over Time – dimension 1 in Table A7.*

## C Hand Coding and Supervised Labeling

For our hand coded analysis, we need to validate that out-of-the-loop human readers identify the same “entertainment” vs “politics” distinction when actually reading the tweet texts. We also seek to place our text scaling estimates onto a more interpretable scale – the proportion of documents about politics or entertainment.

### C.1 Hand Coding: Tweet Sampling and Coding Instructions

To validate the text scaling measure of apolitical tweets, we designed a coding exercise using the research platform Figure Eight. This platform uses Amazon Mechanical Turk, which is an online crowdsourcing service where anonymous workers complete tasks online for small sums of money.

In our task, human coders were first given a set of detailed instructions (see Figure A4 below), and then were given selection of individual tweets. We asked human coders to read each tweet, and assign each tweet to one of four distinct categories: i) Politics and Elections, ii) Social Justice, and Race Relations, iii) Entertainment, and iv) Unclear/Other. Coders were given descriptions of each category as well as example tweets in the instructions, and were instructed that if a tweet falls into two or more categories, to just choose one. If a coder selected the “Other” category, they also had the ability to explain their rationale using an open-ended response text box.

We added the social justice/race relations category both because it is a dominant factor in our text scaling and because these discussions would not necessarily be coded (partisan) *politics* – yet, would nonetheless be relevant to political mobilization on the left and right. Prior studies have established that trolls talked about Black Lives Matter and other social justice topics on the left (Arif, Stewart and Starbird 2018).

We randomly sampled 450 tweets from the left trolls and 450 tweets from the right trolls

for crowd-sourced human coding. Given our interest in late campaign shifts, we sampled those tweets from June 1, 2016 through November 8, 2016. Each tweet was categorized by three independent individuals, who were based in the United States and were ranked as high quality workers by Figure Eight. We assigned a tweet to a topic if two out of three coders chose that topic. The coding task took place on November 23, 2019.

Although we were specifically interested in general campaign messaging in this paper, we nonetheless label all tweets 2015 through 2016 using these labels (see Section C.2).





## C.2 Hand Coding: Human Coder and Supervised Model Evaluations

We first evaluate inter-coder reliability among all human coders and then evaluate “inter-coder” reliability between 2 out of 3 human coders and our (test set) machine predictions. We consider the human coder - machine inter-reliability anticipating that some fraction of the human coders answered randomly, and that using 2 out 3 coders will be more reliable. A machine should be able to pick up on systematic, non-random patterns in training data to predict the categorization of the 2 out of 3 coders in test data.

Inter-coder reliability evaluates how precise our hand labeled data and machine predictions are. The *calibration* of the machine predictions is more directly relevant to social science than accuracy, however, since we are typically interested in aggregate proportions rather than the classification of individual documents (Hopkins and King 2010; Card and North 2018). In this, for example, approximately 60% of tweets assigned a predicted probability of 60% for being about politics should actually be labeled “politics”.

For the calibration evaluations, we present two forms of evidence:

1. we display our results using both machine prediction and hand coded averages (showing that they do not substantively differ), and
2. we display calibration plots.

### C.2.1 Hand Coding: Supervised Models

For machine predictions, we use Lassos (*l1* penalized logistic regressions) (Tibshirani 1996) and the first 10 dimensions of our PCA-based word embeddings (see Section B.1) to predict *each* of the categories. Logistic regression is well-calibrated compared to more complex models (Niculescu-Mizil and Caruana 2005; Card and North 2018), and the Lasso in particular has few researcher selected tuning parameters, especially when compared to neural nets

and random forests. The sole penalization term in the Lasso is selected automatically using cross-validation in standard software packages (we use the R package “glmnet”<sup>24</sup>). As a robustness check, we also show results predicting hand labels using GloVe word embeddings trained on the troll data.

The dependent variable in each of the models is an indicator for whether 2 or more human coders labeled a tweet a given category (e.g. for entertainment, whether 2 or more coders labeled the tweet “entertainment”). In analyses using these predictions, we use predicted probabilities from the models.

### C.2.2 Hand Coding: Interrater Reliability and Prediction Accuracy

In Table A8, we show inter-rater reliability (Fleiss’ Kappa) for the 3 labels on each tweet. These calculations use the kappa.fleiss command in the R package “irr”<sup>25</sup> and the confusion-Matrix command in the R package “caret”<sup>26</sup>.

We anticipated some fraction of the Amazon Turk workers’ submissions to be random *or* for the tweet itself to be uninterpretable, and so had 3 workers code each tweet. In Table A9, we evaluate hand labels for tweets where 2 or more of the coders agreed on a label.

In Table A9, we show inter-rater reliability for the 2 or more coder agreement labels compared to dichotomized machine predictions in a holdout set. For this procedure, we randomly subset our data into approximately 50/50 splits, trained a Lasso on one half of the hand labels, and then evaluated those machine predictions on the remainder of the hand labels. We repeated that procedure 1000 times and report the average of those Kappas, as well as intraclass correlation for continuous predictions and the fraction of hand label for a

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<sup>24</sup><https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/glmnet/index.html> and it by default selects the penalization term using minimum misclassification error in cross-validation

<sup>25</sup><https://cran.r-project.org/package=irr>

<sup>26</sup><https://cran.r-project.org/package=caret>

	Left Troll	Right Troll
Entertainment	0.37	0.29
Politics	0.47	0.55
Social Justice and Race Relations	0.42	0.32
Other	0.14	0.23
Overall human inter-rater reliability		
0.42 (Fleiss' Kappa)		
0.42 (Krippendorff's Alpha)		

In our analyses, we use the hand labels where at least 2 coders agreed, and re-label remaining tweets “other/no agreement”. We evaluate those labels below.

Table A8: *Inter-rater reliability (Kappa, 3 human raters)*

given category.

The continuous intraclass correlations reflect greater accuracy for labels with 100% agreement and somewhat lower accuracy for mixed labels, which are changed to 100% agreement if 2 out of 3 coders agree for the dichotomized evaluation.

All of the categories of interest have moderately high inter-rater reliability.<sup>27</sup> We are only unable to predict the “other/no coder agreement” tweets, suggesting that the texts not considered in our analyses lack systematic patterns to distinguish them from other tweets.

These human-machine Kappas are included here as a comparison for the hand label inter-rater reliability shown in Table A8. In Sections C.2.4 and C.2.5, we show more standard machine learning evaluations for calibration (calibration plots), sensitivity vs specificity (receiver operating characteristic curves), and, across the 1000 replicates shown above, area under the ROC curve.

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<sup>27</sup>Note that a reliable “politics” category for the Right Trolls is sufficient to establish that explicitly political content was common relative to other types of content, including entertainment.

	Left Troll	Right Troll	Combined
<i>Kappa: Dichotomized Labels/Predictions</i>			
Entertainment	0.47	0.33	0.49
Politics	0.53	0.58	0.67
Social Justice and Race Relations	0.53	0.36	0.47
Other	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>Intra-Class Correlation: Fraction with Label/Continuous Predictions</i>			
Entertainment	0.61	0.54	0.65
Politics	0.61	0.67	0.74
Social Justice and Race Relations	0.59	0.54	0.58
Other	0.05	0.12	0.09

Note: training in this evaluation is based on 50% of data to allow for training-test split.

Table A9: *Inter-rater reliability (Kappa or ICC in test set, 2 out of 3 human raters - machine predictions) – see Figure A11 for AUCs.* Test set human-machine reliability here suggests that the 2 (or more) out of 3 agreement among coders picks up on systematic variation in the text. Training sets are approximately 450 observations, while test sets are subset from the remaining observations down to the relevant category (i.e. there are fewer observations in test sets for the left and right troll evaluations). Note that our actual analyses use the entire labeled data set in training – 900 tweets: 208 entertainment, 310 politics, 221 social justice and the remaining designated “other/no coder agreement”.

### C.2.3 Hand Coding: Comparison of Analyses Based on Hand Labels and Machine Predictions

In each of the figures below, we show a) proportions of topics from the hand-coded tweets (with tweets categorized in a topic when 2 out of 3 coders agreed on that topic), and b) proportions of topics from a supervised model trained on the hand-coded tweets.

The Lasso on the PCA-based word embeddings (Section B.1) closely matched the hand-coded proportions but machine predictions did appear to *underestimate* the shift from politics to entertainment seen in the hand-coded data. As a reminder, the Lasso for each of these models used a logistic regression, and the regularization term was selected using minimum misclassification error in cross-validation (the default for binomial models in the “glmnet” R package).

The underestimation of the politics to entertainment shift and the perhaps smoother shift in content do not affect our interpretation of the overall results.




Figure A5: *Coding Validation Results from FigureEight.* (Note: repeated from main text.) This figure shows the results from applying a supervised model to label the full corpus based on a sample of hand-coded tweets. Solid lines are proportions from the supervised model, while dotted lines (and points) are from the raw hand-coded data. Our model only slightly underestimates the fraction of entertainment content in the left-leaning sample. There is some limited evidence of an increase in entertainment content prior to the spike in left-leaning activity.




Figure A6: *Coding Validation Results from FigureEight*. This figure shows the results from applying a supervised model to label the full corpus based on a sample of hand-coded tweets. Solid lines are proportions from the supervised model, while dotted lines (and points) are from the raw hand-coded data. This figures separates the social justice category from the politics and election category. Our model slightly underestimates the fraction of entertainment content in the left-leaning sample.



## C.2.4 Hand Coding: Calibration Plots

In Figure A7, we show calibration plots for each of our category predictions. For all of these predictions, our estimated probabilities approximate the actual proportion of tweets. In these plots, the x-axis is our predicted probability and the y-axis is the proportion of tweets with the hand label of interest. Predictions are placed into 5 bins in order to evaluate proportions based on binary labels.

These plots are best interpreted as assessments of model fit rather than plots representing the accuracy of the model, since these visualization are not based on training-test splits (as shown in Section C.2.2). The figure shows that we were able to fit assigned probabilities to the actual probabilities, despite binomial outcomes.




Figure A7: *Model calibration.*

### C.2.5 Hand Coding: ROC Curves and Confusion Matrices

In Figure A8, we show ROC curves and confusion matrices for each of our category predictions. In the ROC curves, a line at 45 degrees indicates predictions no better than chance. The x axis is the false positive rate (e.g. machine labels “entertainment” while the human coder does not) and the y axis is the true positive rate (e.g. human coder labels “entertainment”, machine also labels “entertainment”). ROC curves are helpful for evaluating binary predictions using data with unbalanced data. Other evaluation methods might, for example, score a model well for predicting that a rare event never occurs – such behavior would be readily apparent in the ROC curve, as well as the confusion matrix.

These plots are best interpreted as assessments of model fit rather than plots representing the accuracy of the model, since these visualization are not based on training-test splits (see Figure A11). The plots show balanced true positive and false positive rates – e.g. though not a major concern in our data, we nevertheless show that we are not achieving high accuracy through predicting all 1 or 0s for common / rare outcomes respectively.

Area under the ROC curve statistics for a 50/50 training-test split are shown in Table A11. This analysis dichotomizes both the hand labels (2 out of 3 or greater agreement) and predictions (greater than or equal to 50% probability).




Figure A8: *Model sensitivity and specificity.*

In the confusion matrices, rather than use the predicted probabilities (as we use for the main analyses), we must dichotomize our predicted values. For this, we assigned the predictions 1 for probabilities greater than 50 percent and 0 otherwise. Keep in mind here that this analysis tells us how precise our predictions *above vs below* probability 50 percent. The top rows here are single points in the ROC curves – the top-right of the matrices x and the top-left of the matrices y. The ROC curves are more informative for true positive and false positive raters over many thresholds. Further, the calibration plots (and comparisons to hand labels over time) are more substantively important, since they inform whether our averages (the quantity of interest in our analyses) well-approximate the reference averages.

	Entertainment			Politics			Social Justice		
	Reference (hand labels)	1	0	Reference (hand labels)	1	0	Reference (hand labels)	1	0
Prediction	1	0.55	0.07	1	0.74	0.07	1	0.48	0.05
(dichotomized)	0	0.45	0.93	0	0.26	0.93	0	0.52	0.95
	Sum	208	692	Sum	310	590	Sum	221	679

Table A10: *Confusion matrices*. This table shows confusion matrices for each of our hand labels and their corresponding predictions. To show proportions matching a single point on the ROC curves above, the reference columns are divided by the total number of hand labels assigned the category (or not).

	Left Troll	Right Troll	Combined
Entertainment	0.86	0.85	0.89
Politics	0.91	0.87	0.92
Social Justice and Race Relations	0.87	0.83	0.86
Other	0.59	0.71	0.66

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Note: training in this evaluation is based on 50% of data to allow for training-test split.

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Table A11: *Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (dichotomized labels).* The data in this figure are drawn from the same 1000 replicates as shown in Figure A9.

## C.2.6 Hand Coding: Predictions Using GloVe Word Embeddings

Predictions based on GloVe word embeddings (Pennington, Socher and Manning 2014) tended to underestimate over-time changes in the tweet contents compared to the hand labels, and predicted evenly distributed labels. We nonetheless see similar patterns in the predictions.

In these figures, the dotted lines are the hand labels, and the solid lines are the supervised model fits to that data.

The word embeddings here were estimated using the R package “text2vec,”<sup>28</sup> with word vectors set to size 100, window size to 5, and alpha 0.5.




Figure A9:

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<sup>28</sup><https://cran.r-project.org/package=text2vec>

## D Additional Results and Robustness Checks

### D.1 Account Activity Timelines

Figure A10 plots the number of user mentions in tweets per account type from June 2014 through the election 2016. The spike in activity among polarized (i.e. left or right troll) accounts in 2015 occurred prior to the first Republican presidential debate, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure A11.




Figure A10: *Changes in use of different types of troll accounts.* Accounts tweeting local news reduced activity from 2015 into 2016, while accounts using polarized, partisan identities dramatically increased activity close to the 2016 election. Left and right trolls are presented together in the top panel of this figure and separately in the bottom panel. Note that less than 0.1% of the all tweets were posted prior to June 2014.




Figure A11: *Changes in use of different types of troll accounts – user mentions.*



## D.2 Messaging Shifts Within Accounts

Figures A12 and A13 below repeat the main analyses with each troll account centered at its mean. These results mirror the findings in the main text – close to the election, left trolls shifted from discussing politics / social justice and race relations to entertainment. We also see a large shift from social justice / race relation to *politics* within accounts on the right as the 2016 election approaches.




Figure A12: Coding Validation Results from FigureEight – centered at mean by account.





Figure A13: Coding Validation Results from FigureEight – centered at mean by account.

### D.3 Results for 2015 through 2016

Figures A14 and A15 below repeat the main analyses for tweets going back to 2015.

The hand label predictions for 2015 should be interpreted with caution because we did not hand label any data from 2015. In particular, the increasingly political tweets from conservative accounts could reflect either a shift in topics not detectable with our 2016 hand labels, or a genuine politicization among those accounts. Either way, it is perhaps instructive to see that there was no shift among the liberal accounts, other than the very sparse and noisy activity in the first half of 2015 and earlier.




Figure A14: *Coding Validation Results from FigureEight – extended to 2014 through 2016.* Vertical lines in this figure are 1) the first Republican presidential debate (August 3, 2015) and 2) the earliest tweets hand-coded. We show the first Republican debate line in the activity figures as well – Figures A10 and A11.

The figure below shows that the within account shifts from entertainment to politics occurred within accounts from 2015 through 2016.




Figure A15: Coding Validation Results from FigureEight – extended to 2014 through 2016. Vertical lines in this figure are 1) the first Republican presidential debate (August 3, 2015) and 2) the earliest tweets hand-coded.




Figure A16: Coding Validation Results from FigureEight – extended to 2014 through 2016, accounts centered at means. Vertical lines in this figure are 1) the first Republican presidential debate (August 3, 2015) and 2) the earliest tweets hand-coded.

## D.4 Comparisons of 2015 and 2016 Tweets Using Mutual Information

We focus our main analyses on tweets posted in 2016, but some of the troll accounts were active well prior to 2016. In this section, we use mutual information (Manning, Raghavan and Schütze 2008) to calculate what words distinguish the 2015 content from the 2016 content. Mutual information here measures which words provide the largest amount of information about whether their containing tweets were posted in 2015 or 2016.

This analysis illustrates differences in messaging from 2015 to 2016 that we likely do not address in our main analyses. In the 2015 words, we see discussion of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and Ukraine-related news or propaganda.

In the following tables, we repeat this 2016 vs 2015 analysis by account category, and further calculate which words best distinguish a given account category from others.

All Trolls	
2016 words	2015 words
trump	fukushima
black	love
https	ukraine
hillary	httpt
clinton	chernobyl
blacklivesmatter	quote
httpst	true
gloedup	rap
islamkills	nuclear
giselleevns	npp
white	ukrainian
danageezus	life
pjnet	imho
httpstco	lentarofficial
tcot	httptco

Table A12: *Distinctive words 2016 vs 2015, by mutual information.*

<b>Left Trolls</b>		
Distinctively Left Troll Words (vs. other trolls in 2016)	2016 words (vs. 2015)	2015 words (vs.2016)
blacklivesmatter	black	news
black	https	baltimorepost
gloedup	trump	sports
police	blicqer	braveconwarrior
blacktwitter	gloedup	ebbdcfcfdeaaedadadfefbeafdce
staywoke	talibkweli	local
cops	amp	bbsp
blicqer	httpst	independent
policebrutality	white	politics
white	httpstco	httpst
bleepthepolice	nowplaying	httpstco
blm	blackhistorymonth	blackpeopletwitter
trayneshacole	btp	isis
talibkweli	beingblackis	chris
https	thehill	httpstc

Table A13: *Left troll distinctive words 2016 vs 2015 and Left Troll vs others, by mutual information.*

<b>Right Trolls</b>		
Distinctively Right Troll Words (vs. other trolls in 2016)	2016 words (vs. 2015)	2015 words (vs.2016)
hillary	trump	news
trump	hillary	braveconwarrior
tcot	islamkills	sports
pjnet	clinton	independent
obama	https	local
clinton	pjnet	chris
news	tcot	money
realdonaldtrump	ccot	love
ccot	amp	bbsp
wakeupamerica	brussels	life
refugees	httpst	httpstco
isis	stopislam	make
maga	trumpforpresident	httpst
via	vote	selfie
hillaryclinton	hillaryforprison	politweecs

Table A14: *Right troll distinctive words 2016 vs 2015 and Right Troll vs others, by mutual information.*

### Hashtag Gamers

Distinctively Hashtag Gamer Words (vs. other trolls in 2016)	2016 words (vs. 2015)	2015 words (vs.2016)
midnight	giselleevns	love
giselleevns	danageezus	true
danageezus	chrixmorgan	life
mustbebanned	boothprince	rap
igetdepressedwhen	trump	quote
ihatepokemongobecause	worldofhashtags	usa
chrixmorgan	amp	heart
rejecteddebatetopics	phonline	never
istartcryingwhen	bunniboila	quotes
toavoidworki	midnight	happiness
tofeelbetteri	kattfunny	sometimes
myolympicsportwouldbe	andyhashtagger	will
betteralternativetodebates	annogalactic	success
andyhashtagger	https	things
donttellanyonebut	gamiliell	mind

Table A15: *Hashtag gamer distinctive words 2016 vs 2015 and Hashtag Gamer vs others, by mutual information.*

### News trolls

Distinctively News Troll Words (vs. other trolls in 2016)	2016 words (vs. 2015)	2015 words (vs.2016)
news	world	chicago
sports	trump	news
politics	zika	breaking
local	aleppo	local
business	warfareww	showbiz
foke	environment	newyork
chicago	sanders	foke
health	topnews	texas
topnews	syria	baseball
police	clinton	houston
world	tech	orleans
texas	cruz	atlanta
breaking	brexit	reuters
tech	rio	detroit
says	mosul	astros

Table A16: *Newsfeed Troll distinctive words 2016 vs 2015 and Newsfeed Trolls vs others, by mutual information.*

## D.5 Network Community Detection

We use the account categories of Linvill and Warren (2020) in our main analyses, but these categories can also be identified using network community detection (Fortunato 2010). Communities are a natural feature of social networks, in that social networks have clusters with high connectivity within a group and low connectivity to others outside the group. For the trolls, the promotion of the same Twitter accounts and of each others' Twitter accounts would both increase their reach and, if distinct from the rest of activity on Twitter, likely increase the probability of discovery by Twitter itself (or, at least, raise the probability of a review of the clusters).

In Figure A17, the colors on the left correspond to clusters derived from a commonly applied community detection algorithm (Clauset, Newman and Moore 2004) and the colors on the right correspond to the account categories of Linvill and Warren (2020).

The categories correspond to highly clustered communities of interactions. As shown in prior work (Stewart, Arif and Starbird 2018), the trolls retweeted and mentioned relatively non-overlapping accounts. We show the limited overlap in clusters here both to validate the hand labeled categories and also to justify the cluster-specific text analyses, since we expect vocabulary to be distinct across clusters as well.

In the pre-processing for the network clustering figure, the user-mention data are represented using rows for the mentioned users and columns for the tweeting users, with the number of user-target mentions as elements. We standardize the rows of this matrix by dividing their row-wise sum<sup>29</sup> and then use the cross-product of that matrix as the graph for the network detection algorithm. This graph represents the co-mentions of trolls conditioning on the overall mentions of the targeted accounts.

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<sup>29</sup>With this standardization, the clustering algorithm does not strongly prefer to optimize connectivity for only the most activity accounts, and instead treats accounts relatively equally.



To identify clusters much like Linvill and Warren’s, we can use the fast greedy algorithm (Clauset, Newman and Moore 2004) implemented in igraph to maximize modularity in the troll-to-troll graph. Modularity maximization algorithms select a number of clusters and cluster assignments that maximizes the number of within cluster connections and minimizes the number of across cluster connections. Colors are each assigned to the community containing the largest number of a given Linvill Warren category.




Figure A17: The left panel of this figure shows troll clustering (sharing tweets from the same accounts) using automated community detection while the right panel shows clustering using Linvill and Warren (2020)’s hand coding. Consistent with prior work, account categories can be easily separated using community detection algorithms. Colors are each assigned to the community containing the largest number of a given Linvill Warren category. Accounts with activity below the 50th percentile are not shown in this visualization.

## D.6 Voter Suppression

We have presented the strategic use of apolitical content as one strategy to demobilize potential voters on social media. An alternative strategy is voter suppression, or tweets that actively discourage users to participate in the election. For example, this could include tweets saying “boycott the election” or “do not vote”.

A handful of studies have documented this behavior during the 2016 presidential campaign. The white paper by cybersecurity firm New Knowledge, commissioned by the Senate, first documented the use of voter suppression tactics across multiple platforms (DiResta et al. 2019). Similarly, a report from the Computational Propaganda Research Project at Oxford also noted some troll activity involved campaigning for African American voters to boycott election on Twitter (Howard et al. 2018). Kim (2018) looks at sponsored advertising discouraging voting on Facebook and Instagram, and finds evidence that these ads targeted nonwhites or likely Clinton voters. However, the focus of prior research has not necessarily been to identify the frequency of voter suppression tweets.

We can use our data to explore to what extent the IRA used a strategy of voter suppression, in addition to distraction from flooding. To do so, we look for any mention of “vote”/“voting”/“voted”, “election”, “support”/“supported” (i.e. any characters matching “vote”, “voting”, “election”, “support”), as well as negation (to be inclusive here, any characters matching: “not”, “n’t”, “boycott”, “sit out”, “truth”, “rigged”, “before”, “illegal”, “deserv”, “fuck”). The additional negation words cover phrases identified by prior studies (DiResta et al. 2019; Howard et al. 2018; Kim 2018) as examples of demobilization from suppression: boycott, don’t vote, do not vote, didn’t vote, sit out the election, fuck the election, do not support, don’t support, can’t support, not voting, rigged, before you vote, illegally voted, truth about the election, deserve our vote (presumably implying *don’t* deserve). We do not explicitly search for complex and malicious information about the voting process (for more on election incidents using Twitter, see Mebane et al. (2018)).

Beyond this, we use the average sentiment of tweets using the AFINN sentiment lexicon (Nielsen 2011), and categorize the voting tweets above as “negative” for average less than 0 (each word in this lexicon is scored from -5 to 5, with words less than 0 negative). We can also look to what extent this strategy was used by conservative or BLM leaning troll accounts.

Figure A18 documents our findings. While we find some evidence of voter suppression tweets, they are rare, especially in comparison to flooding of entertainment content. Mentions of voting at all are a small fraction of tweets until the last week of the election, very few tweets include the negation and suppression words, and left trolls were no more likely than right trolls to negate or use negative sentiment in voting tweets.




Figure A18: *Voting and voter suppression*. This figure shows that the right trolls mentioned "vote", "election", "support" in around 35% of tweets in the week leading up to the election, while the left trolls tweeted these words in slightly over 10% of tweets. Left trolls were not more likely to negate or use negative sentiment in their tweets about voting.

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